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Introduction  
The attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were seen 
initially as a “bolt from the blue," but were, in fact, in the planning stage from 1995 onwards. The 
plans themselves were carefully adapted and refined in ways designed to increase the prospects 
of success. They were also given a much higher level of funding than any other al-Qaeda attack. 
Indeed, it has been estimated that the cost of mounting the attacks for al-Qaeda was about 
$500,000. Although this is a trivial sum when compared to the death and destruction that were 
caused, the psychological impact which shattered United States illusions of invulnerability, and 
the impact on the economy of the United States which lost billions of dollars, it was nonetheless a 
significant investment, and one that involved the transfer of substantial sums of money to the 
hijackers prior to the attack.  
Had law enforcement and intelligence agencies been focused on these money flows or sensitive 
to their potential significance, then the catastrophic surprise of September 11 might have been 
avoided. This is not to suggest that financial transfers were the only indicator. Indeed, there were 
several other indications of the impending attacks that could have provided some degree of 
warning for the United States, had there been better inter-agency coordination and intelligence 
sharing and greater receptivity to the possibility that civilian airliners might be used as weapons. 
At the same time it is important not to under-estimate the sheer difficulty of the intelligence 
process—which is less about finding a needle in a haystack than finding a particular needle in a 
stack of needles—by imposing what one management analyst has termed “retrospective 
coherence.”[ 2] For the most part, the signals were scattered, fragmentary, incomplete, 
indeterminate, and surrounded by noise.[3] The hijackers made mistakes, but the mistakes were 
not sufficient to alert authorities to the impending action. In the aftermath of the attacks, however, 
the United States formulated a comprehensive strategy against al-Qaeda that included an assault 
on the network’s finances as well as efforts to strengthen indicators and warnings of future 
terrorist attacks.  
These two aspects of the United States response to al-Qaeda—developing better indicators and 
warning on the one side and trying to freeze and seize terrorists assets on the other—created 
dilemmas that have not yet been resolved, required difficult and uncomfortable tradeoffs that 
have yet to be made. The decision to freeze and, where possible, seize terrorist assets was an 
important part of the effort to weaken al-Qaeda’s capacity to carry out further attacks, but in some 
respects ran counter to the possibility that following the money trail might offer important insights 
into future terrorist operations. Frozen assets cannot be moved and therefore deprive intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies of opportunities to monitor the movement or transfer of funds that 
might be used for the next attack. The justification for freeze and seize, of course, is that the loss 
of monitoring opportunities is outweighed by denying terrorists access to funds. Yet, it is far from 
clear that the attack on terrorist finances has yielded to the kind of results initially anticipated. In 
fact, the global campaign aimed at terrorist assets is more accurately characterized as a dismal 
failure than a qualified success. Against this background, this paper sets out to:  
· highlight some of the reasons why the freeze and seize strategy has not been more 
successful, and to consider if this lack of success is a result simply of inadequate policy 
or of more fundamental structural factors that are impossible to overcome.  
· identify the various ways in which financial transactions of different kinds could provide 
indicators, both of a potential attack and of the ways in which terrorist organizations are 
not only reacting to the attacks on their financial base but also responding more generally 
to the pressure exerted on them by national governments and the international 
community.  
· make recommendations about the optimum trade-off between freezing assets and 
following the money trail.  
Attacking Terrorist Finances: A Failed Strategy?  
In the months following the September 11 attacks the international community, led by the United 
States, was able to freeze approximately $100 million of terrorist funding. Subsequent efforts over 
the next three years, have failed to add much more than $40 million to the total of frozen or 
confiscated funds. Some of the reasons for this are traceable to the inherent inadequacies of 
global regimes designed to combat terrorist financing; others stem from the availability to terrorist 
networks of alternative methods of raising and moving money; and yet others reflect the agility, 
flexibility, adaptability, and sheer ingenuity of terrorist networks that are not burdened with the 
constraints of sovereignty, not confined to the use of formal financial institutions, and not 
dependent on state sponsorship for their income.  
This third factor—the capacity of terrorist organizations to adapt quickly to new regulations by 
adopting novel methods of circumventing rules and restrictions—is a major part of the problem for 
the United States and the international community. Containing and constraining transnational 
networked adversaries who play by their own rules is a formidable undertaking. Indeed, if we use 
a complexity theory lens to consider the terrorist financing issue we can more readily see that 
some of our policies are likely to be not only limited in their impact but also counter-productive. In 
the final analysis, the attack on terrorist finances might simply make terrorist networks smarter 
than they would otherwise be.  
The inadequacies of global financial regimes  
In some respects, the effort to target terrorist financial assets was doomed to failure from the 
outset. The approach simply extended the existing global anti-money laundering regime to 
include efforts to combat terrorist finances. The problem was that this regime—which had been 
developed in the 1990s to combat drug traffickers and transnational criminal organizations—had 
serious shortcomings. The key player in the regime was the Financial Action Task Force created 
by the G-7 in 1989. The FATF enunciated 40 recommendations that:  
· emphasized the need for legislative measures to enable authorities to identify, trace, 
evaluate and confiscate laundered money or property of corresponding value;  
· highlighted the need for financial transparency which required measures to obtain 
information about the true identity of persons on whose behalf an account was opened or 
a transaction conducted; and  
· provided a bench-mark against which national efforts to combat money laundering could 
be assessed. Indeed the 40 Recommendations can be understood as an attempt to 
establish an anti-money laundering regime with two broad components: a domestic 
regulatory regime that encompassed monitoring and reporting of cash transactions above 
a certain amount ($10,000 in the United States), the reporting of suspicious transactions, 
and know your customer and due diligence requirements; and a regime for international 
cooperation against money laundering that embodied mutual legal assistance treaties 
(MLATS) extradition, cooperative investigations, the sharing of information, and greater 
responsiveness to “on-request” information exchanges in response to suspicious 
transactions, and to requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate 
proceeds.  
Although the FATF did not develop a formal convention, implementing the 40 recommendations 
became a crucial requirement for the member states (the 26 original members and those which 
joined subsequently) and provided the basis on which the FATF has subsequently developed a 
three-fold role:  
· monitoring the progress of the member-states in implementing measures to counter 
money laundering through annual self-assessments and more detailed mutual 
evaluations; this was done though review processes that provided opportunities to put 
considerable moral and political pressure on governments that were not in compliance 
with the recommendations and, therefore, not meeting their obligations. Under pressure 
from the FATF, for example, Austria grudgingly agreed to eliminate anonymous savings 
accounts that ran against FATF notions of transparency and accountability.  
· reviewing money laundering trends, techniques and counter-measures and their 
implications for the forty recommendations—and sharing this information among the 
members so as to enhance their capacity to counter innovations or new trends in 
laundering. This has resulted in annual meetings and reports on money laundering 
typologies. In recent reports, the FATF members have focused attention on specific 
money laundering mechanisms such as trade-related schemes, informal remittance 
systems, internet banking, and the role of company-formation agents.  
· extending the adoption and implementation of the FATF recommendations in an attempt 
to build a global anti-money laundering network. This process has two separate but 
complementary components: broadening membership to include new countries such as 
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina; and the creation of regional groupings with a similar 
mandate to the FATF itself. The Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering 
Group (ESAAMLG) created in August 1999 is an example of the second variant.  
In effect, the FATF has sought to extend the scope of anti-money laundering measures 
geographically, sectorally and functionally. In 1996 it recommended that money laundering crimes 
be extended beyond the predicate offense of drug trafficking and that consideration be given to 
imposing restrictions on the use of new technologies to conduct financial transactions that were 
remote, anonymous, and outside traditional institutions. Not surprisingly, these proposals were 
accompanied by the recommendation that the same laws and regulations that had been 
developed for the banking sector be extended to non-bank financial institutions. More recently, 
the FATF gave teeth to its efforts by developing and publishing criteria for identifying “non-
cooperative jurisdictions,” and actually naming those states which fell into this category. This 
marked a new stage in the effort to establish an effective global anti-money laundering regime. It 
was based on the recognition by the FATF that “continued mobilization at the international level to 
deepen and widen the fight against money laundering” remained essential in the second decade 
of the organization’s existence.  
The FATF has some real achievements: in particular the promotion of international information 
exchanges on recent trends and developments in money laundering is extremely valuable. FATF 
also placed the money laundering issue on the international agenda to a degree that was difficult 
to imagine in the late 1980s. Moreover, the “name and shame” campaign had some success in 
forcing a number of jurisdictions to meet international norms and standards by creating greater 
financial transparency, imposing reporting requirements for both cash transactions and 
suspicious transactions, and establishing Financial Intelligence Units to monitor the financial 
system. It was not surprising, therefore, that in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the 
FATF extended its mandate to terrorist finances. If the FATF has rightly obtained major plaudits 
for imposing an anti-money laundering regime, however, the congratulatory rhetoric hides a 
reality that is more complex and somewhat disappointing. In spite of its successes, the FATF has 
suffered from several flaws:  
1. The first major deficiency is the emphasis on procedural norms rather than the 
creation of substantive norms with substantial impact. International cooperation 
against money laundering became a goal in its own right rather than simply a 
means to an end. Even more important, the cooperative venture became 
fundamentally flawed by elevating form over substance. The FATF established a 
set of standards and practices that require considerable effort but that do not 
yield commensurate results. The FATF has imposed procedural requirements 
that states adopt certain forms of regulation designed to inhibit or detect and 
prosecute money laundering. Although this has probably had some impact in 
obstructing and displacing money laundering, in substantive terms the 
achievements have been disappointing. This is not surprising: cash transaction 
reports and suspicious transaction reports are enormously time-consuming and 
yield vast amounts of information, but very few successful prosecutions. The 
United States and the states of the European Union have far more elaborate and 
formalized rules against money laundering than any other countries—yet they 
remain probably the largest laundries in the world. This suggests that the FATF’s 
approach to combating money laundering results in the wrong questions being 
asked. The focus is on whether or not the participating states meet FATF 
standards, rather than on whether or not the measures which have been 
introduced by states are effective in combating money laundering. The result is 
an impression that far more is being achieved than is actually the case. Until the 
FATF not only develops measures of effectiveness that reflect real rather than 
ostensible results but also addresses the substantive effectiveness of procedural 
norms in combating money laundering, some states will manage to be 
simultaneously wonderful launderettes and in good international standing.  
2. In spite of the broadening of its membership and the expansion of its geographic 
reach the FATF still remains circumscribed geographically. As a result, its impact 
is not to halt money laundering but merely displace it to locations where the risks 
are lower. A partial regime in the money laundering field creates balloon effects 
in the global financial system similar to those created by enforcement in the “war 
on drugs” at the local level.  
3. The third problem is that of covert defection from the regime. Governments play 
games and will increasingly do so in relation to the anti-money laundering regime 
and its offspring, the regime to combat terrorism finances. States such as Russia 
have created new laws and score highly in terms of international cooperation—
but have not been nearly so effective at implementation. Since the problem of 
defection can take many forms, a much more sophisticated approach to notions 
of conformity with the regime is essential. The levels of conformity that need to 
be examined include not only the legal framework, but the capacity for 
implementation, the number of indictments, the number of prosecutions, and the 
number of convictions. Without this much more rigorous approach, some 
governments at least will continue to engage in cosmetic conformity, ostensibly 
performing to the standards demanded but doing very little in practice to meet 
these standards.  
4. The fourth problem is that, more often than not, money laundering is 
transnational and multinational in scope. Not only do the launderers operate on 
the basis of jurisdictional arbitrage, but they also exploit jurisdictional voids and 
deliberately create jurisdictional confusion which makes it difficult to follow the 
money. Indeed, only if international cooperation is truly genuine, sustained, and 
systematic will there be real successes in prosecuting transnational money 
laundering cases.  
In short, the anti-money laundering regime has some fundamental flaws that limited its impact 
even on the initial target set. These deficiencies are even more telling when the targets become 
not profit-seeking groups (where removing the money flow and thereby reducing the profits 
challenges the raison d’etre of the organizations) but groups or networks where money is no 
more than a means to achieve political objectives. Terrorist are less concerned about laundering 
dirty money than using clean money to further the cause—which includes carrying out additional 
attacks. Moreover, the way in which al-Qaeda has beaten the U.S. government in winning the 
“battle of the story”[4] suggests that cosmetic conformity and tacit defection is likely to be the 
norm in a large part of the Islamic world.  
Operations are cheap  
A second major problem with the extension of strategies initially designed to attack the profits of 
organized crime, is that the success level has to be much higher when dealing with terrorists 
even though the target profile is so much smaller. Indeed, the inherent advantage lies with the 
terrorists simply because most terrorist attacks can be carried out without large expenditures of 
money. The Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004 for example, are generally believed to have cost 
no more than about $10,000. Even though for this figure might be somewhat on the low side—
and a $20,000 to $30,000 estimate might be more accurate—even this larger assessment is still 
a relatively modest amount of money. Other terrorist attacks such as the Bali nightclub bombing, 
the attack on the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the Cole bombing, and the thwarted strike against 
the U.S. Embassy in Paris in the summer of 2001, have been carried out for between 20,000 and 
$75,000. The implication, of course, is that unless efforts to constrict the flow of finances to 
operational cells are extremely successful they are unlikely to degrade the capacity of terrorist 
networks to carry out new attacks.  
Alternative means of raising and moving money  
A third difficulty for the United States and the international community in attacking the financial 
basis of terrorist organizations is that both terrorist organizations and their financial support 
structures are not static targets. This is evident in two distinct phenomena. The first is that 
although the focus on financial support for terrorism from Islamic charities has led to the closure 
of some of these charities, the charities have adapted in a variety of ways. In some cases the 
head office has closed but branch operations continue to operate unhindered; in others the 
charities have simply re-registered and re-opened under new names but with the old 
infrastructure intact. A third approach has been to support terrorists less through direct 
contributions than through logistic support (such as employment in a charity branch office.)[5] The 
essential point is that some of the prime targets of the effort to combat terrorist finances have 
displayed a degree of resilience and a capacity for morphing and adapting that have neutralized a 
very precise and well-planned strategy by the United States and its allies.  
This is not to suggest that the strategy has had no impact. Clearly the financing of terrorist 
organizations is much more problematic than it was: funds from the charities are neither as 
plentiful nor as easily moved as in the past. Terrorist organizations have compensated for this, 
however, with their own form of adaptability and emergent behavior. This is reflected in terrorist 
appropriation of organized crime activities which are increasingly used to make up the shortfalls 
in funding from the charities. Kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking, other forms of smuggling, 
credit card theft and fraud, document fraud, and robbery have become staple features of the 
terrorist fund-raising repertoire. Such activities have been evident in locations as diverse as 
Colombia, the Philippines, Central Asia and Western Europe. This is not surprising: most 
organized crime activities do not have a steep learning curve; nor do they require significant 
upfront investments. Given the low entry costs on the one side and the gains that can be made 
on the other, the exploitation of organized crime methods by terrorist organizations and networks 
is a natural and foreseeable (if unstoppable) development. What is surprising, however, is the 
extent to which different terrorist organizations operating with diverse political agendas in various 
parts of the world have engaged in the same forms of adaptive behavior—and in so doing have 
neutralized the “global” effort to undermine terrorist finances.  
Stopping the flow of money to the sharp end of terrorist networks is impossible. Consequently, a 
reappraisal of the efforts to combat the financing of terrorism is essential. With the rationale for 
the freeze and seize campaign undermined by a continued lack of effectiveness, the tradeoff 
issue between freezing and following the money should be resolved in favor of the latter option. 
The argument in favor of this is even more compelling because the attempt to freeze terrorist 
funds has not only failed, it has actually been counter-productive. This can be explained most 
clearly in terms of two components of complexity theory: the notion of co-evolution and the idea of 
a fitness landscape. The coevolution concept recognizes that the United States government and 
al-Qaeda are in a highly interdependent relationship. Within this interdependence, however, al-
Qaeda as the weaker entity has to exhibit greater sensitivity to United States initiatives than vice 
versa. If it is to survive, al-Qaeda has to evolve quickly in response to environmental shaping 
measures initiated by the United States. It can do so partly because of its reliance on network 
structures and partly because of its learning capacity. Indeed, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups 
are adept at organizational learning and this enables them to mutate into unfamiliar forms, adopt 
novel and unexpected methods of operation, and generally confound measures designed to 
constrain them. In this connection, the notion of a fitness landscape is particularly pertinent. 
Because of the coevolution of competing systems or organizations, the outcome of the 
competition will be determined largely by which one evolves most rapidly and effectively to the 
challenges posed by the other. Thinking in terms of the fitness landscape, the danger is that 
governments will compel terrorists to move to new fitness peaks in the landscape yet fail to move 
to higher peaks themselves. The effort to freeze terrorist assets has created precisely this 
outcome. Efforts by the United States and the international community to combat terrorist 
finances through freeze and seize have compelled Islamic charities and al-Qaeda to move to 
higher fitness peaks, but it is not clear that the institutions in the forefront of the international effort 
to combat terrorist finances can do the same. Indeed, it is arguable that one of the major 
consequences of the freeze and seize strategy has been to make it even more difficult to follow 
the money and use money as a critical warning indicator. 
Even before this occurred, however, following the money was a formidable task. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that the financial dimensions of terrorist activity offers opportunities for intelligence 
collection and analysis that might be important in providing warning of impending attacks. This 
theme must now be elaborated.  
Financial Transactions as Warning Indicators  
There are several ways in which financial transactions could provide indicators of a possible or 
impending attack. In only very few cases, however, will the financial transaction provide the 
critical indicator. In most cases, the transaction will simply become part of a broader picture and 
add a piece to the overall understanding and assessment of what is going on. In some instances, 
this can be the critical piece in illuminating and crystallizing what had hitherto been uncertain; in 
other cases, it is merely one part of a broader picture that remains murky and diffuse. With this 
caveat in mind there are several dimensions of financial transactions that need to be considered:  
· Financial movements and expenditures as a critical component of attack preparations.  
· Money as a connection between a known part of the terrorist network and an unknown 
part.  
· Changes in the predominant patterns of financial transactions within and by a terrorist 
network, perhaps signaling an extension of terrorist activities and a focus on a new set of 
targets.  
· Criminal activities of a terrorist cell that are either designed to fund terrorist action by the 
cell itself or to provide support for a cell that is planning an attack.  
· Suspicious financial transactions (i.e. financial transfers, deposits or withdrawals of 
whatever amount that either appear to have no economic rationale or that, for whatever 
reason arouse the suspicions of banking personnel).  
There is clearly some overlap among these various indicators. Criminal activities at the cell level 
to provide operational funding, for example, are very closely connected to financial expenditures 
as a critical component of attack preparations. Nevertheless, it is worth distinguishing between 
these indicators, recognizing that in practice, the greater the concentration of indicators, the more 
confident the judgments and warnings that are based on them. With this in mind each of the 
possible indicators must now be explored.   
1. Financial Expenditures as a Critical Component of Attack Preparations.  
 As suggested above, terrorist attacks are relatively inexpensive, as one would expect from what 
is often considered as a form of asymmetric warfare, and a weapon of the weak against the 
strong. In the case of the projected al-Qaeda suicide bombings on the United States embassy in 
Paris and the Consulate in Marseilles in the summer of 2001, Jamal Beghal, the leader of those 
involved, was to go to Morocco to pick up $50,000 for the operation. The cost of the abortive 
attack on the Christmas market in Strasbourg in December 2000 was probably somewhere 
between $20,000 and $30,000.[6] Although the costs will depend in crucial ways on the precise 
nature of the operation, it seems likely that they fall into several categories:  
· Subsistence for the perpetrators as they prepare for their actions. The day to day living 
expenses are not trivial even if the terrorists live a very frugal lifestyle. If they try to blend 
in through frequenting social events and clubs, their expenditures will increase. The costs 
will also vary depending on the location of the targets, and the proximity of the terrorists 
to these targets. The costs of operations in the United States or Western Europe will 
obviously be considerably greater than operations in countries such as Tanzania, Kenya 
and Yemen.  
· The cost of special training and the development of expertise that is critical to the 
successful completion of the mission. Although many of the skills necessary for an 
operation will have been developed at terrorist training camps, some of the more 
specialized requirements can only be met through more legitimate and more costly 
avenues such as attendance at flight schools.  
· The purchase of any weapons or explosive materials that are to be used in the attack. 
The September 11 hijackers were relatively unusual in that they were so lightly armed. In 
other cases, however, the acquisition of explosives or weapons is more costly—
especially if combined with efforts to disguise the activities. Ahmed Ressam, the LAX 
bomber reportedly spent about $7,000 in Vancouver on the purchase of explosives prior 
to his attempt to enter the United States to implement the millennium plot. In the case of 
the terrorists in Frankfurt planning an attack in Strasbourg, the cost of the raw materials 
was increased because they traveled extensively and bought small amounts in an 
attempt to avoid suspicion—although they also used stolen credit cards for the purchases.  
· The cost of travel for meetings related to the plan. In most cases of planned or actual 
attacks by terrorist networks operating in the United States and Western Europe, there 
was considerable travel prior to the event itself. The reasons for this can include 
meetings among the conspirators, meetings with senior people in the network, or 
meetings with members of the network providing some kind of support services. 
Mohammed Atta’s trip to Spain, for example, in July 2001 could well have included 
meetings with the Spanish cell that had been providing support to Atta and his group 
while they were in Hamburg.  
· The cost of communications among those involved. Communication costs, of course, 
have declined enormously with cell phones, pre-paid telephone cards and e-mails (often 
from public libraries and Internet cafes). Nevertheless, these costs still have to be 
included in the overall cost of the mission. Moreover, even though cell phones and pre-
paid telephone calls are relatively cheap, the tendency to use them and quickly dispose 
of them in order to maintain operational security can add to the costs.  
In other words, certain kinds of expenditures have to be met—and therefore have to be funded 
either by those directly involved in the operation or by their supporters. In some cases, the 
payments for the purchases (whether material or services such as training) can be an indicator. In 
others, the transfer or raising of money to fund purchases and meet other costs for the terrorists 
can also help to reveal attack preparations.   
2. Money as a Connection between Known and Unknown Parts of Terrorist Networks  
Terrorist organizations that use network structures pose difficult problems for law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies. Mapping the network is an enormously difficult and complex task for 
several reasons: the inherent dynamism and expansionism of the network as it draws in new 
recruits; the fact that although parts of the network might be well known, other loosely coupled 
components will be at some distance from the core of the network, both geographically and in 
social network terms, and therefore inherently difficult to trace or identify; and the fact that 
deliberate efforts are being made by the terrorists to maintain anonymity and a low profile. One of 
the responses to this is to monitor the communications of known members in the hope that this 
will provide additional clues about unknown members of the network. Although terrorists 
sometimes limit their communications in a deliberate effort to avoid detection, in some 
circumstances, communication becomes essential. Indeed, one reason for communication is to 
ensure there is adequate funding for a planned operation. Monitoring such communications can 
provide missing pieces of the puzzle and allow law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
connect components of a terrorist network in ways that allow them to take decisive action in 
forestalling an attack. Perhaps the best example of this concerns the Meliani terrorist cell in 
Frankfurt that, in December 2000, was planning an attack on the Strasbourg Christmas market 
and Cathedral. Members of the cell were under surveillance by German law enforcement. 
Although their actions were suspicious, however, it was not clear what they were planning and 
there was no obvious reason for apprehending them. The group had bought chemicals for making 
explosives with stolen credit cards supplied to them by a support group in Milan. Moreover, they 
still had “almost $14,000 (£9,675) in cash—some of it …raised by drug dealing on the streets of 
Frankfurt."[7] Nevertheless, “the cell members needed more money. They went back to their 
paymasters. It was the mistake that destroyed the mission.”[8] A member of the Frankfurt cell 
called a key al-Qaeda operative in Britain known as Abu Doha or “the Doctor," asking for more 
money and informing him that the operation would be carried out before the end of the year. 
British intelligence agents had Doha under surveillance and monitored the call. They then 
informed the German authorities, providing a critical piece of information that enabled the 
Germans to act preemptively and forestall the planned attack. In this case, not only was an 
additional segment of the network identified, but the information was so good that it facilitated 
action preventing the planned attack from coming to fruition.  
In effect a puzzle was solved when a secret was uncovered. Actions that had earlier been difficult 
to explain or understand now became part of a recognized pattern of attack preparation. Although 
critical tactical intelligence about the target of the attack was still missing, enough indicators had 
been uncovered to justify decisive action. This case might have been exceptional in that the 
payoff in terms of attack prevention was so high. Nevertheless, the importance of money as a link 
or connector between the known and the unknown segments of the network transcends this 
particular case. At the very least, following money flows can assist in mapping the network and 
identifying previously obscured or unknown nodes and connections.  
3. Changes in the predominant patterns of financial transactions by terrorist networks  
As more details have been uncovered about Islamic terrorist finances in general and al-Qaeda 
finances in particular, it has become clear that one important and recurring pattern has been the 
use of charities for both raising money and moving money. This is an important pattern that 
facilitates careful monitoring and the potential acquisition of good tactical intelligence. Changes in 
financial flows within terrorist networks, for example, might suggest that new targets have been 
identified or there is a shift of priorities on the part of the terrorist network and its leadership. 
Channeling of funds in a direction that they have not hitherto gone can be a clue to an impending 
operation, usually in an area where it is otherwise unexpected. When known or reconstituted 
Islamic charities suspected of being covers for terrorist networks appear in countries where 
previously they had no presence this is an important indicator that new targets are either under 
consideration or have already been selected. If the charities are already present, then serious 
shifts in funding levels and a surge of funds into the charity in general, or the country office in 
particular, can be another important indicator. Sudden surges might be particularly revealing, but 
even more gradual surges could offer a degree of warning and, at the very least, impel much 
closer scrutiny.  
The speculation after September 11 about al-Qaeda owned stock being sold prior to the attacks 
on Washington and New York was inconclusive. Nevertheless, the idea behind the speculation 
was very sound: what occurred seemed to have been some kind of deviation from an established 
pattern of investment, possibly caused by prior knowledge. As such, it clearly merited attention. 
Moreover, it again suggests that in the financial world surge activity of one kind or another might 
require careful scrutiny. The problem, of course, is that such surges of activity are ubiquitous. 
They are often caused by rumor or by some shift in the political or economic context. 
Nevertheless, this is another area where close human scrutiny combined with innovative data-
mining techniques might uncover indicators that would otherwise be missed.  
4. Criminal activities to fund terrorist action  
As suggested above, what might be termed “do it yourself organized crime” by terrorist networks 
has become an important and almost ubiquitous tool for terrorists. This has been evident in 
organizations ranging from the IRA to the Tamil Tigers. It has also been apparent in al-Qaeda 
and other Islamic terrorist organizations. In some instances, criminal activities are used at a 
strategic level as part of the overall funding mechanism for the terrorist organization. Hezbollah 
supporters or members involved in cross-state cigarette smuggling in the United States, for 
example, have sent the proceeds to the home organization. Similarly, Tamils in Canada who 
have been involved in such diverse crimes as drug trafficking and credit card fraud have sent a 
significant part of the profits back to Sri Lanka for the LTTE. In other cases, however, criminal 
activities are undertaken at the tactical or cell level, where they are used to fund specific terrorist 
activities. In the al-Qaeda network, despite the presumed wealth of the organization and of Bin 
Laden in particular, cells planning terrorist operations have received very little money from the 
leadership. Instead they have been compelled to engage in petty crime and minor forms of 
organized crime to acquire the necessary funding. Ahmed Ressam, for example, robbed hotels 
and unsuccessfully attempted to hold up a currency exchange office. His request for more money 
from al-Qaeda was turned down and as a result, he opened a store in Montreal where he 
collected credit card information that was then passed to associates for fraud.[9] Similarly, the cell 
in Frankfurt engaged in drug pushing as a source of sustenance while planning the Strasbourg 
attack. Yet other groups engaged in selling false identities as a means of raising money. From 
this perspective, the criminal activities of a terrorist cell that are designed to maintain the cell and 
provide operational funding can be an indicator that the cell is preparing for action.  
Yet there is an additional twist. In the European al-Qaeda network of 2000 to 2002 there 
appeared to be a division of labor among the cells, with some clearly designated as operational 
and others providing a financial support role. The cell in Milan under Ben Khemais, for example, 
stole credit card that were subsequently used by the Frankfurt group to purchase chemicals for 
explosives. In other words, criminal activities of one cell can be part of the support structure for 
another cell. This division of labor within a small matrix generally results in a one-way flow of 
money. This can provide indicators of which cell is actually planning an operation. Moreover, in 
some cases, the criminal activity leaves a trail that enables investigators and intelligence analysts 
to connect the dots and obtain a more accurate picture of at least one segment of the overall 
terrorist network.  
5. Suspicious Financial Transactions  
In its effort to combat drug trafficking and organized crime by making it more difficult to launder 
money through the financial system, the United States government, in effect, coopted the banks. 
Regulations were established to ensure that all cash deposits of $10,000 or more were 
accompanied by a cash transaction report (CTR) – which the bank subsequently had to submit to 
the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). In addition, any 
transaction that aroused the suspicion of bank employees—irrespective of the amount involved—
had to be passed to law enforcement in a suspicious activity report (SAR). While some critics 
suggest that the effort involved especially in CTRs but also in SARs does not yield commensurate 
payoffs, the SAR mechanism in particular offers a way of identifying activities that are worth 
investigating further. Although this mechanism was initially designed to assist in combating drug-
related money laundering it has broader application. The suspicion can come from the person (or 
persons) involved in the transaction, from the fact that there is no obvious commercial or financial 
basis for the transaction, from concern about the country or city of origin, or a variety of other 
considerations Indeed, the requirement to report suspicious activities or transactions has become 
a standard not only for the United States but for most countries with well-developed, sophisticated 
financial systems. When accompanied by provisions for due diligence and know your customer 
requirements, the SAR system provides opportunities for warning about criminal activity.  
Such a system has some relevance to terrorist activity. The difficulty is that terrorist financial 
transactions cannot simply be equated with money laundering—in spite of the tendency of many 
commentators to make such an equation. In fact, the two phenomena, although occasionally 
converging, are mostly very different. Money laundering takes dirty money, hides its origins and 
ownership, and makes it appear to be the proceeds of legitimate economic activity. In essence it 
is about taking dirty money and making it clean so that it can be enjoyed. Terrorist operational 
financing, in contrast, takes money and simply uses it for terrorist attacks and their preparations. 
More often than not this is clean money that is being used for nefarious purposes. Although 
terrorism financing might encompass money laundering when the money involves the proceeds 
of crime, even then much of the money is simply spent rather than put through an elaborate 
laundering process. For the most part, therefore, terrorists do not actually launder much money. 
This is not to deny that terrorist networks want to move their money covertly and with the same 
lack of attention from the authorities that criminals seek when they move the proceeds of crime. 
In this sense, some terrorist financial activities clearly involve the “functional equivalent of money 
laundering” and employ many of the same mechanisms and modalities for moving money as do 
transnational criminal organizations. In some respects, terrorists have even added to the 
repertoire of options for moving money by supplementing or even supplanting front companies 
with charities. Al-Qaeda has also made extensive use of underground banking such as the 
hawala system to move money without leaving a significant paper trail. Yet al-Qaeda also uses 
the normal banking system where its transactions are very hard to distinguish from legitimate 
business activities and financial transfers.  
There are occasions, when the SAR system can trigger a warning that might be linked to terrorist 
activity. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, as investigators sought to discover the 
activities and movements of the hijackers, it was learned that a money transfer from the United 
Arab Emirates to SunTrust Bank in South Florida that had provided crucial funding support to 
several of the hijackers had also prompted a suspicious activity report. Unfortunately the report 
had not been followed up with a further investigation. Nevertheless, it does reveal that because 
the SAR system is designed to flag all suspicious transactions and is not limited to those involving 
money laundering it can, on occasion, provide an indicator of money transfer linked directly to 
support of terrorist operations.  
This is not to suggest that following the money is a magic bullet that invariably leads to early 
detection and warning. As with all other aspects of counter-terrorism intelligence, attempts to use 
the movement and disbursement of money as a warning indicator will involve false leads, false 
positives, and false alarms. At the same time, leads that could offer warning indicators might 
appear so innocuous that they are overlooked or discounted. In this area, as in any part of the 
intelligence domain, signals and noise are often only distinguishable in retrospect. Moreover, 
there is a serious problem with efforts to link finances to operational planning and attacks by 
terrorists—the relatively small part of terrorist financial resources that are devoted to operations 
as opposed to recruitment and training. In other words, the financial signals themselves are 
intrinsically quiet, modest, and a very small part of the overall financing effort. A third difficulty is 
that many if not most financial transactions are neutral in the sense of setting off alarms. They 
take on real significance only when they are carried out by or involve people who are themselves 
regarded as an actual or potential threat—either because they are known or suspected terrorists 
or because they have strong associations with terrorists. It is the marrying of the person or 
persons and the transaction that is critical, rather than the transaction itself. If this is enough to 
suggest that there are limits to the use of financial flows and financial transactions as warning 
indicators, however, it does not mean that this dimension of activity can or should be ignored. In 
combating terrorism, financial scrutiny is a key component of a much broader process that also 
has to include network analysis, travel and telephone toll analysis, as well as fusion of open 
sources and covert intelligence such as electronic intercepts and information from defectors.  
In delineating possible indicators of an embryonic, fully planned, or impending terrorist attack, it is 
necessary to consider several aspects of the intelligence process including the frequently made 
distinction between puzzles and secrets, the importance of both patterns and anomalies, and the 
need for both strategic and tactical forms of warning.  
Many analysts have observed that the intelligence challenge in the post Cold war era is often a 
matter of solving puzzles rather than discovering secrets. The puzzles themselves are generally 
complex and multi-layered, requiring comprehensive efforts to solve them. Yet the distinction 
between puzzles and secrets is not clean and neat. Those who are part of the puzzle, for 
example, often take precautions to ensure that many of their activities are secret or covert. 
Terrorists and criminal networks, in particular, operate in the shadows, shielding their activities 
from intelligence and law enforcement scrutiny in an effort at risk minimization. Avoiding surprise, 
therefore, requires both solving puzzles and uncovering secrets. In this context focusing on the 
financial dimension of terrorism is essential. Such a focus can help both to uncover secrets and to 
solve puzzles. Obtaining knowledge about the financial flows of terrorist networks, for example, 
can help to assess the scope of the network and the thrust of its activities. Such knowledge can 
also provide insights into flows of money (including small amounts) that might be precursors to a 
terrorist attack. In this sense, following the money trail can be a critical element in uncovering 
secrets. As such it is crucial to efforts to avoid surprise  
Part of the intelligence process can be understood in terms of both pattern detection and anomaly 
detection. Identification or detection of patterns is a central component of int elligence analysis 
and contemporary data mining, which is “concerned with uncovering patterns, associations, 
changes, anomalies, and statistically significant structures and events in data."[10] Even within 
this search for patterns, however, there are two complementary but distinct activities that can 
occur in the mining and analysis process: pattern discovery when there is no prior knowledge of 
the patterns, and pattern matching when a pattern that is identified in the data is identical with a 
pattern that is already known. In addition, patterns of either kind, also make it possible to identify 
deviations. A clear and recurring pattern that appears to be well-established provides a baseline 
from which it is possible to detect and assess changes, departures, or deviations. Such changes 
either provide indicators of an anomaly that needs to be further examined or of something that is 
recognizable and understood as a transition from one pattern of behavior to another. The 
anomaly itself is: either indicative of change to another pattern that is familiar and understood as 
such (pattern recognition); or a blip or aberration that is not indicative of a new pattern (true 
anomaly); or a development, the significance of which is uncertain, but that requires further 
scrutiny because of the possibility that it represents a new pattern (uncertain anomaly); or 
indicative of a change to a new pattern the purpose, meaning and significance of which is not yet 
understood (pattern discovery). In other words, the recognition of an anomaly sets off a search for 
meaning that can result in:  
· a changed assessment of what is going on;  
· a determination that although things have changed, the significance of the change is 
uncertain but requires continued monitoring and assessment;  
· the dismissal of the anomaly as simply an unusual or unique incident that is unlikely to be 
repeated.  
Whatever, the conclusion, though, it is clear that patterns provide a sense of order and establish 
baselines from which it is possible to discern deviations or anomalies that also help to strengthen 
understanding. In this connection, it is important to understand patterns of terrorist financing—
how they typically raise money, move money and spend money. With this baseline established, 
changes in the patterns can be better understood. In some cases, these changes—especially as 
they relate to disbursement—will be potential indicators of terrorist attacks.  
In terms of levels of warning, part of the challenge for counter-terrorism intelligence is that it is 
relatively easy to obtain strategic warning—Osama bin Laden himself made very clear that he 
was declaring war on the United States several years prior to the September 11 attacks—that 
some kind of attack is likely to occur. The difficulty, however, is going from the general to the 
specific, or from strategic warning to tactical warning. As a recent analysis of intelligence analysis 
and assessments prior to the September 11 attacks noted, “Tactical warning enables 
policymakers and government decision-makers to direct preventive action against specific 
individuals who may be involved in the planned attack and to implement appropriate protective 
action for specific targets."[11] Unfortunately, tactical warning regarding the time, target or 
method and the perpetrators of an impending attack is far more difficult to obtain—particularly 
where the terrorists have managed to obtain operational security. The challenge, therefore, is to 
link financial indicators to this tactical level of warning.  
Conclusions  
The implication of all this is that terrorist financial transactions can be an important —if elusive —
indicator of a planned or impending attack. For the most part, however, such indicators need to 
be combined with other intelligence as part of a comprehensive assessment. While financial 
transactions alone are unlikely to provide definite and unequivocal warning, sometimes these 
indicators will spark a search for other parts of the puzzle, providing a stimulus for a tighter focus 
or simply a heuristic for a shift in direction. If their value as indicators is to be maximized, however, 
then there are several other things that need to be done as part of the intelligence process. Some 
of these occurred as part of the immediate response to September 11, but need to become 
standard operational procedures.  
· Establish a base-line of understanding about terrorist finances that encompasses 
knowledge of established patterns and sensitivity to deviations, anomalies, and the 
possible emergence of new patterns. The deeper the knowledge base and the greater 
the level of understanding of terrorist finances, the greater the chance of detecting 
activities or shifts in activities that provide warning indicators.  
· Bring together combinations of expertise from disparate fields. In examining financial 
transactions, national security intelligence personnel and even law enforcement agents 
need accountants and banking and financial experts who are familiar with the often 
arcane practices of the financial world and adept at following money trails and identifying 
anomalies.  
· Recognize that analysis is as important as collection. If the information has been reported 
but not analyzed the result is the same as if it had not been reported in the first place. 
This has been particularly the case with SARs. The analysis of SARs needs to be 
expedited and the results shared with the wider intelligence community on a timely basis.  
· Information needs to be pooled, shared and widely examined in the intelligence 
community to ensure that financial indicators are seen in a broader context and 
considered along with other possible indicators of a forthcoming attack. In attempting to 
combat terrorist networks, government itself needs to operate as a network, transcending 
the bureaucratic turf wars and obstacles to information sharing that characterized the 
intelligence process prior to September 11. Information is not a resource to be guarded 
but one to be shared as widely as possible within the bounds of an intelligence 
community that goes well beyond the traditional agencies.  
· Information needs to be widely diffused not only within the Federal government but also 
at the state and local level—albeit with sensitivity to security concerns. As a study of the 
ecology of warning carried out by Global Futures Partnership at CIA noted, the 
consumers for warning go well beyond the traditional national security community. This is 
particularly the case now that terrorist organizations are engaging in do-it -yourself 
organized crime since the people best placed to detect specific examples of this are in 
local law enforcement. The broadening of the customer base can have a positive 
feedback effect where specific warnings provoke a further search for indicators that can 
augment and refine the whole process.  
None of these measures is a palliative. Nor are they a guarantee that financial indicators will 
always be identified and understood as such. Much of the time the intelligence task is an attempt 
to know the unknowable. And sometimes even when something is known its significance is not 
always fully understood or appreciated. Nevertheless, these kinds of changes—which are really 
about attitude, procedure, and bureaucratic norms and practices rather than about bureaucratic 
structures—are essential to ensure that financial indicators become an integral part of the 
indicator and warning process and a part that can have significant payoffs in terms of early 
warning.  
The other thing that needs to be done—and this can be tacit rather than explicit—is to back away 
from the effort to freeze terrorist assets. This might be politically difficult given that frozen funds 
provide a tangible measure of effectiveness. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that such 
figures are usually endowed with more significance than they deserve, obscure more than they 
reveal, and give a misleading impression of the success of the counter-terrorism strategy. 
Moreover, the unintended consequence of the freeze strategy is to make terrorist networks such 
as al-Qaeda even better at hiding their money—and thereby making it more difficult to follow the 
money and perhaps obtain the level of warning that is necessary. The tacit abandonment of the 
freeze strategy, therefore, might be an important contribution to the detection of financial 
indicators that would otherwise be elusive and the achievement of a degree of warning that would 
otherwise be unobtainable. Although such a conclusion is counter-intuitive, it is also inescapable.  
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